Security is critical to a wide range of wireless data applications and services. While several security mechanisms and protocols have been developed in the context of the wired Internet, many new challenges arise due to the unique characteristics of battery powered embedded systems. In this work, we focus on an important constraint of such devices -battery life -and examine how it is impacted by the use of security protocols.
INTRODUCTION
Today, an increasing number of battery-powered embedded systems -PDAs, cell phones, networked sensors, and smart cards, to name a few -are used to store, access, manipulate, or communicate sensitive data, making security an important issue. Security concerns in such systems range from user identification, to secure information storage, secure software execution, and secure communications. Most battery-powered systems contain wireless communication capabilities for untethered o eration, introducing new security concerns due to the public nature o&he physical communication medium or channel.
With the evolution of the Internet, network and communications security has gained significant attention [ l , 2, 3, 41. Secure communication across wired and wireless networks is ty ically achieved by employing security protocols at various layers o&he network protocol stack (e.g., WEP [SI at the link layer, IPSec [6] at the network Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. To copy otherwise, to republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. 
layer, TLS/SSL [7]
and WTLS [SI at the transport later, SET at the application layer, etc.). The building blocks of a security rotocol are cryptographic algorithms, which are selected based on tge security objectives that are to be achieved by the rotocol. They include asymmetric and symmetric encryption algoritkms, which are used to provide authentication and privacy, as well as hash or message digest algorithms that are used to provide message integrity.
While security protocols and the cr ptographic algorithms they contain address security considerations $om a functional perspective, many embedded systems are constrained by the environments they operate in and the resources they possess. For such systems, there are several challenges that need to be addressed in order to enable secure computin and communications. For battery-powered embedded systems, pergaps one of the foremost challenges is the mismatch between the (energy and performance) requirements of security processing ' and the available battery and processor capabilities. Rapid increases in communication data rates and security levels required, together with slow increases in battery capacities, threaten to widen this "battery ap" to a point where it will impede the adoption of applications a n t services that require security.
In this work, we demonstrate that security processing can have a significant impact on battery life. The energy analysis in this study is performed by executing secure data transactions on a battery-owered system (a Compaq iPAQ PDA [9] ), measuring the current Brawn from the power supply, and calculating the energy consumed during the time intervals in which the security protocol or its constituent c ptographic algorithms are executed. Our results can be used to exgore the impact of various parameters, at the protocol and cryptographic algorithm levels, on overall energy consumption for secure data transactions. Based on our analysis, we discuss various opportunities for energy-efficient implementations of security protocols.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 motivates the need to address energy consumption issues in security protocols. Section 3 introduces the reader to pertinent security terms and concepts. Section 4 describes the experimental research testbed used in our work to execute and analyze secure wireless transactions, and provides details of the energy measurement testbed. Section 5 presents the results of our energy measurements, applies this information to analyze the SSL protocol, and su gests ways of optimizing the energy requirements of SSL. Section 8 summarizes the insights gathered in this work, and enumerates future avenues of research.
MOTIVATION
We consider the following example system to motivate the need to address energy consumption issues in security rotocols: a sensor node, using a Motorola ."DragonBall" MC683%3 processor and operating at a data rate of lOKb s consumes 21.Sml and 14.3ml, for transmitting and receiving 182i bits of data, respectively [lo] . In secure mode, when RSA enc ption is used as part of a security protocol, encrypting 1024 bits oydata on the node was observed to consume 42ml of energy. Thus, given a typical battery capacity of 26KJ in sensor nodes, it can be shown that with encryption on the battery runs out more than twice as fast as when there is no encryption. This example motivates us to investigate techniques to facilitate energy-efficient execution of security protocols. This objective can be achieved in multiple ways. For example:
By making the execution of underlying cryptographic algorithms efficient through a combination of hardware and software techniques [ l l , 12, 13, 14, 151, we can improve the performance and energ requirements of security protocols. Usually, there is an overxead, in the form of increase in silicon area I We use the term security processing to refer to any computations performed for the sake of security, including the execution of security protocols and cryptographic algorithms. or more complex software, associated with these techniques.
We can make the security protocols energy-cognizant, by allowing them to alter their operation depending on the o er ating environment. This adaptation of behavior is guidecfbi rules, which determine the best possible alternative with respect to energy efficiency, under any given in ut conditions. These changes may involve a conscious tradeok between the level of security and energy.
The challenges of energy-efficient secure communications can be better addressed if energy requirements and bottlenecks are well understood. In this work, we perform a detailed analysis of the energy requirements of various cryptographic primitives, with the intention of using this data as a foundation for devising energy-efficient security protocols. We performed several experiments where we varied several protocol and cryptogra hic al orithm level parameters and observed the im act on energy. $e use t8e results of our experiments to suggest wa s &r making the execution of the SSL protocol energy-efficient. lecurity protocols and cryptographic algorithms are known to have significant computational requirements, and studies have indicated that they stretch the processor ca abilities available in many embedded systems [16, 17, 18, 19 , $0, 211. While researchers have quantified and addressed the performance overhead of security, the energy im lications are relative1 less understood. Nevertheless, researchers Rave recently proposedYinteresting ap roaches to the design of li htweight security protocols. Low-power [ey management protocok have been devised for sensor nodes by analyzing the impact of security algorithms on the energy consumption of sensor nodes [lo] . The work in [22] evaluated the energy consumption of selected keyexchange protocols on a WINS sensor node, and pro osed energyefficient ways for exchanging cryptographic keys, Whig custom protocols for low-ower mutual authentication were proposed in [23, 24] . Energy tradeois in the network protocol and key management design space of sensor nodes were explored in [25] . Techniques to minimize the energy consumed by secure wireless sessions have also been proposed in [26] . We believe that com rehensive energy analyses of security protocols, such as the one per&rmed in our work, will facilitate identification of energy bottlenecks and development of energyefficient security mechanisms.
PRELIMINARIES: THE SECURE SOCKETS LAYER (SSL) PROTOCOL
In this section, we provide a brief overview of the popular security protocol SSL, which is widely used for secure connection-oriented transactions. SSL offers the basic security services of encr ption, source authentication, and integrity protection, for data excganged over underlying unprotected networks. The SSL protocol is typically layered on top of TCP/IP layers of the protocol stack, and is either embedded in the rotocol suite or is integrated with applications such as browsers. &e SSL rotocol consists of two main layers as shown in Figure 1 . The SSE record {rotocol provides the basic services of privacy and integrity to the igher-layer protocols: SSL handshake, SSL change cipher and SSL alert. Let us now examine how the SSL record protocol is used to encry t application data. The first ste involves breaking the application &ta into smaller fragments. Eac! fragment is then compressed, if compression options are enabled. The next step involves computing a message authentication code (MAC), which facilitates message integrity. The compressed message plus, MAC is then encrypted using a symmetric cipher. If the symmetnc ci her is a block cipher, then a few padding bytes may be added. Final&, an SSL header is attached to complete the assembl of the SSL record. The header contains various fields including tie higher-layer protocol used to process the attached fragment.
Of the three higher-layer protocols, SSL handshake is the most complex and consists of a sequence of steps that allows a server and client to authenticate each other and negotiate the various cipher parameters needed to initiate a session. For example, the SSL handshake is responsible for negotiating a common suite of cryptographic algorithms (cipher-suite), which can then be used for session key exchan e, authentication, bulk encryption and hashin The ciphersuite RgA-3DES-SHA1, for example, indicates that RfA can be used for key agreement (and authentication), while 3DES and SHAl can be used for bulk encryption and integrity computations, respectively. More than 30 such cipher suite choices exist in the OpenSSL implementation [27] of the SSL rotocol, resulting from combinations of various cipher alternatives ! or implementing the individual security services.
Finally, the SSL change cipher protocol allows for dynamic updates of cipher suites used in a connection, while the SSL alert protocol can be used to send alert messages to a peer. Further details of the SSL protocol can be found in [3] . Figure 2 describes the experimental setup used to execute secure client-server interactions, and the testbed developed to quantify the energy consumption of the various constituent security protocols.
EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
The ex erimental setup for secure client-server communication consists o f a client that connects to a LAN throu h a wireless access oint, while the server is a PC that is wired to tfe LAN. The handReld used in the experiment is a Compaq iPAQ H3670, which contains an Intel SA-1 110 StrongARM processor clocked at 206MHz. It is provided with 64MB of RAM and 16MB of FlashROM, and has an ex ansion sleeve whlch allows for memory expansion using compact lash cards. It connects to the wireless access point using a Cisco Aironet 350 series WLAN card. The handheld also su ports additional communication capability through a.serial port, a US! port and IrDA at 115. The energy consumption values for individual cryptographic algorithms are obtained by running their implementations on the client, and measuring the current drawn from the power supply. Figure 2 also shows the arrangement used for measuring the energy consumption of the cryptographic algorithms. The energy measurement is done using LabVIEW [29], a GUI-based data acquisition, measurement analysis, and presentation software. The data acquisition software runs on a PC (called a power measurement system), which is also directly connected to the handheld through its serial port. This enables the handheld to send synchronization signals to the data acquisition unit to start and stop the energy measurements. This signaling mechanism allows us to precisely measure the energy dissipated by the chosen software kernels. The current drawn by the client is measured by connecting a sense resistor in series between the handheld and the energy source, i.e., the battery. The voltage drop across the sense resistor is measured using an SCB-68 YO connector block [29] . This block interfaces to the data acquisition software, LabVIEW, through a data acquisition (DA) card in the PC running the LabVIEW software. LabVIEW is used to calculate the energy supplied to the handheld by integrating power over the time interval between the start and stop synchronizing signals.
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RESULTS
In this section, we present a comprehensive empirical analysis of the energy consumption characteristics of cryptographic algorithms (Section 5.1) using the experimental set-up described in Section 4. We also present a comprehensive energy analysis for various stages of the SSL protocol (Section 5.2).
Energy Analysis of Cryptographic Algorithms
We first analyze how the choice of a cryptographic algorithm for a given function (privac message integrity and authentication) and the choice of settin s i $r various cipher parameters (key size, cipher mode) can leaf to varying levels of energy consumption (Sections 5.1.1 -5.1.4). While the energy results were evaluated in the context of the SSL protocol, the conclusions are broadly applicable since the same underlying cry tographic algorithms are used in other rotocols such as WTLS, IF'gec, etc. The last part of this section (lection 5.1.5) illustrates the energy consumption versus security trade-offs possible by identifying and varying cipher parameters in a cryptographic algorithm.
Symmetric Ciphers
Symmetric ciphers can be chosen from two classes for use in a security protocol -block and stream ci hers Block ciphers operate on similar-sized blocks of lain text anlcipher-text. Examples of block ciphers include DES, 3bES,AES, etc. Stream ciphers such as RC4 convert a plain-text to cipher-text one bit (or byte) at a time. Before a block or stream cipher starts the encryptioddecryption operation, the input key (usually, 64 bits) is expanded in order to derive a distinct and cryptographically strong key for each of the rounds (key setup). Encryption or decryption in symmetric algorithms then proceeds through a repeated sequence (rounds) of mathematical computations. Figure 3 shows variations in energy consumption due to the use of different symmetric ciphers. Energy numbers for the key setup phase and energy-er byte numbers for encryption/decryption phases are shown for eac! cipher. The results are reported for one specific mode of each block cipher -ECB or electronic code book, where a fven plain-text block always encrypts to the same cipher-text block or the same key (the impact of different modes on energy is explored later in Section 5.1.4). The only exception is RC4, which is a stream cipher. Taking into account both the key setup and encryptioddecryption costs, we see from Figure 3 energy cost and BLOWFISH the greatest. The large cost of BLOW-FISH is primarily due to its very high key setup cost, since the expanded key in BLOWFISH consists of sub-keys totaling 4168 bytes which delivers very robust security. The cost of BLOWFISH encryption/decryption is uite small. In case of sufficiently large data transactions, one w o u l~ expect the cost of key setup to be amortized by the low encryption cost. It is interesting to note that the energy costs of IDEA, for both encryptioddecryption and key-setup, compare well with those of AES. However, the cry tanalytical strength of AES is superior to that of IDEA, making the Former an attractive option. Table 1 summarizes the energy cost of commonly used hashin a1 gorithms. In general, hash algorithms are the least complex ofthe cryptographic algorithms, and should intuitively incur the least energy cost. From Table 1 , MD2 and HMAC are observed to be more compute-intensive than the rest of the hash algorithms. HMAC is a keyed hash, and as the bit-width of the key is increased from 0 (no key) to 128 bits, the energy cost varies by a very small amount. SHA and SHAl are newer hash algorithms, and have more number of steps than MD4 and MD5. Also, SHA and SHAl are supposed to have better collision resistance, i.e., probability of two inputs mapping to the same hash value, than MD4 and MD5. These benefits of SHA (and SHAI) come at the cost of a slightly higher energy cost than MD4 and MD5. 
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Asymmetric Algorithms
Table 2 compares the energy consumed by the three federal information processing standard (F1PS)-approved asymmetric algorithms for generating and verif ing si natures in security protocols: RSA, digital signature algoritlh (D8A) and elliptic curve digital signature algorithm (ECDSA). Note that we use a 163-bit key for ECC computations, which is proven to be equivalent to a 1024-bit key for RSA [30] . The ener y values are reported for the three main steps associated with digitaf signature algorithms: key generation, signature creation (Sign) and signature verification (Verify). We assume a priori generation of the parameters used in the key generation process, as is the case in resource-constrained devices. The results show that ECDSA consumes less energy than DSA. However, ECDSA and RSA digital signature algorithms have complementary energy costs. RSA performs signature verification efficiently, while ECDSA imposes a smaller cost for signature generation. The difference between the energy costs of signature generation and verification in RSA is much greater than in ECDSA. If a mobile client is required to perform freuent signature generation, then it seems preferable to use ECDSA ?or low-power reasons. On the other hand, if the fre uency of signature verification is greater than signature generation, %en RSA digital signature algorithm should be employed.
Asymmetric algorithms are also widely used for performing key exchange. Table 3 compares the standard algorithms used for key exchan e, Diffie-Hellman (DH) and its elliptic curve analogue (ECDH). We ofserve that a 163-bit ECDH consumes much lesser energy than a 1024-bit DH key exchange. The energy cost of the DH algonthm can be drastically reduced b decreasin the size of keys from 1024 bits to 512 bits. However, tiis benefit foes come at the cost of reduced security.
Impact of Cipher Parameters
The energy analysis of cryptogra hic algorithms is not complete without considerin the several moles of o eration and tunable parameters associate$ with each ci her, whicE can result in algorithmic variants with significantly digerent energy consumption characteristics. We illustrate this fact by studying the energy consumption Figure 4 . The glot shows that the OFB and PCBC modes for DES encryption differ y a factor of nearly 2X in terms of their energy consumption. 
Energy Consumption Versus Security Trade-offs
If different security levels can be provided in a cryptographic algorithm, each with associated energy consumption characteristics, a security protocol can be adapted to a level of security commensurate with the current state of the battery of the system. Table 5 identifies different security levels for the RC5 cipher, obtained by changing the number of rounds used in the ci her, for a given key and block size (128 bits). Each entry indicates tte data (number of attempts) needed for a successful attack against RC5 using differential and linear cryptanalysis techniques. The symbol > denotes the case when the attacks are deemed im ossible even theoretically. We measured the energy consumption oPRC5 for various security levels, and the detailed energy versus security trade-off curve is shown in Figure 5 . This shows a scheme for lowering the energy consumption by adjustin the security level from high to mid to low, achieved by changing &e number of RC5 rounds from 20 to 16 to 8, respectively. Figure 7 shows the typical (client-side) sequence of operations for a secure session that uses the SSL protocol. The first stage involves loading the client certificate from local storage, decrypting it usin a symmetric cipher and performing an integrity check. Once the SIL handshake initiates a session, the client and server begin a sequence of exchanges which result in the client-side operations shown in the figure. The operations include (i) Server authentication, where the client verifies the digital signature of the trusted certificate authority (CA) on the server certificate through decryption using the public key of the CA, followed by an integrity check, (ii) Client authentication, where the client enerates a digital signature by hashing some data using MD5 and ShA-1 algorithms, concatenating the di ests, and encrypting the result with its private key, and (iii) Key excfange, where the client generates a 48-byte pre-master secret (used to generate the secret key for the record stage) and encrypts it with the public key of the server. Once the connection is established, secure transmission of data proceeds through the SSL record stage. Figure 8 examines the energ consumption contributions from the handshake and record stages o?the SSL protocol for various transaction sizes. We can see that for small transaction sizes (upto 256KB), the SSL handshake protocol dominates the overall energy consumption (e.g., 98 .9% for 1KB transactions), while for large transactions, the energy consumption of the SSL record protocol is significant (e.g., 80.4% for 1MB transactions). Since both the handshake and record stages of the SSL protocol include various cryptographic operations (asymmetric, symmetric and integrity operations) and noncryptographic processing (protocol processing), we also present a fine-grained breakup of ener y consumption into these components. Figure 9 summarizes our fincfings for three different transaction sizes (IKB, IOOKB, IMB). From the figure, we can see that the contribution to overall energy consumption due to protocol processing increases with the transaction sizes. The energy consum tion of cryptographic processing is dominated by asymmetric cipters for small transactions and symmetric ciphers for large transactions. Having examined the energy consumption characteristics of the SSL protocol, we now analyze how the energy consumption of the handshake and record stages is affected by vanous protocol-level services as well cryptographic algorithm parameters. S ecifically, we describe how the use of client authentication impacts tEe energy consumption due to SSL handshake and how the choice of cipher-suite affects the energy consumption of both SSL handshake and record stages.
Energy Analysis of the SSL Protocol
Impact of Client Authentication and Asymmetric Cipher Choice on SSL Handshake
We investigated the ener y cost of the SSL handshake protocol using the RSA algorithm ancfthe ECC algorithms (ECDSAECDH) to implement various public-key o erations. The results of our analysis are presented in Figure 10 . TEe SSL handshake can be performed between a server and a client with or without client authentication.
In the case of handshake without client authentication, the following operations are performed by the client and the server: 0 RSA-based handshake: The client performs two RSA public ke operations (verify and encrypt), and the server performs an RJA private key operation (decrypt).
ECC-based handshake:
The client performs verification using ECDSA, and a ECDH operation is performed to compute the shared secret. The server performs an ECDH operation to calculate the shared secret. If client authentication is required, some extra o erations need to be performed. The extra Operations to be performezby the client and the server are: Figure 10 shows the energy consumed by the SSL handshake process using RSA or ECC al orithms for the handheld functioning as a client or a server. Though &e handheld typically behaves as the client in a majority of transactions, it may sometimes be required to play the art of the server. In order to investigate this scenario, we allowed the [andheld to perform the server operations for collecting the corresponding energy data. Energy data were also collected for studying the impact of client authentication in all the cases. With respect to the client energy cost, we can see from the figure that RSA-based handshake is much more efficient than ECC-based handshake, when there is no client authentication in the SSL handshake stage. However, in the presence of client authentication in SSL handshake, ECC-based handshake consumes less energy than RSA-based handshake. Thus, depending on whether client authentication is performed or not, either RSA-based handshake or ECC-based handshake should be chosen by the client for optimizin its energy consumption. In general, we believe that various protocof level parameters have interdependent effects on energy, leading to many interesting trade-offs.
Impact of Cipher-suite Choice on SSL Energy Consumption
The energy cost of the SSL record stage is mainly determined by the amount of bulk data that is transmitted. Analysis of the cipher suites shows that careful choices of cry tographic algorithms need to be made, in order to optimize energy juring the record stage. Consider the following two cipher suites, ECC-BLOWFISH-SHA1 and ECC-AES-SHA. A cursory examination would conclude that the second cipher suite is more energy-efficient, given the very high cost of key setup in BLOWFISH. However, Figure 11 shows that if the amount of data transacted is greater than 7.9 KB, then, in fact, the first cipher suite is more efficient. This is because the cost of key setu in BLOWFISH is radually amortized, and the advantages of BLBWFISH come into pfay. Figure 11 illustrates the energ consum tion of two cipher suites, RSA-RCS-SHA and E C C -3 D E h I A . *he public-key algorithm (RSA or ECC) is used in the SSL handshake stage and the symmetrickey algorithm (RC5 or 3DES) is used for bulk encryption in the SSL record stage. The figure shows that for data sizes smaller than 21 KB, ECC-3DES-SHA is more energy-efficient because ECC is simpler than RSA (and asymmetric energy consumption dominates that of small data transactions). However, for transactions where there are significant bulk data (greater than 21 KB) to encrypt, RSA-RCS-SHA consumes less energy, because for large data transfers energy consumption of symmetric ciphers dominates the total energy spent, and RCS is much simpler than 3DES. This shows that a judicious choice of crypto raphic algorithms can greatly reduce the amount of energy consumef. 
Scope for Optimizing SSL
The energy analyses of the SSL protocol and cryptographic algorithms allow us to ex lore various o tions for optimizing the energy consumption of the &L rotocol. d e SSL handshake protocol can, for example, be optimizetdepending on whether client authentication is performed or not, by choosing ECC algorithm in the former case, and RSA algorithm in the latter case. Usually, applications which require a high degree of security need client authentication. In case of applications, where security requirements are not stringent, further energy savin s can be obtained b switching to smaller keys. Energy savings can f e obtained in the &L record protocol, by choosing a symmetric algorithm depending on the size of the data to be transacted, such that the overall energy consumption is reduced. In order to account for all the factors on which the energy consumption of the SSL protocol depends, we propose the formulation of an energy cost function, which can be parametrized on a number of factors, such as (i) use of client authentication in handshake, (ii) asymmetric algorithm used in handshake, (iii) key size of the asymmetric a1 orithm, (iv) symmetric al orithm used in the record sta e, (v) hash aiorithm used in the recorfstage, (vi) size of the data t o t e transmitted, etc. The cost function can be used to decide the best performing among possible alternatives, depending on the input conditions. Such higheve1 macro-models are the subject of future work, and would allow static, as well as dynamic, optimization of the SSLprotocol for energy efficiency.
CONCLUSIONS
In this work, we presented a framework for analyzing the ener y consumption of security protocols. Asymmetric algorithms have t8e highest energy cost, symmetric algorithms come second, and at the bottom are the hash algorithms. The energy cost of asymmetric algorithms is very much de endent on the key size, while that of symmetric algorithms is not affected to the same extent by the key size. The cost of symmetric algorithms is made up of two parts, namely, the key set-up (key expansion) and encryptioddecryption cost. There is a wide variation in the energy costs within the same family of cryptographic al orithms, i.e., among as mmetric, symmetric and hash alorithms. %he ener y costs of the landshake and record stages of the 8SL protocol vary fiepending on parameters like functionality desired in the handshake, size of hulk data transacted, etc. These conditions reveal the opportunity for making the execution of security protocols dynamic in nature. The protocol execution can be altered depending on the input conditions, such that security of transactions is provided with o timal energy consumption. Future research needs to be done towar& this end.
